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The Prisoner’s dilemma game has been a key conceptual tool for
analyzing social behavior for over 50 years. A recent study shows how the
spatial scale of competition in this game critically determines when
cooperation can emerge.Bernard Crespi
A hydrogen bomb is an example
of mankind’s enormous
capacity for friendly
cooperation. Its construction
requires an intricate network
of human teams, all working
with single-minded devotion
toward a common goal. Let
us pause and savor the glow
of self-congratulation we
deserve for belonging to such
an intelligent and sociable
species.
— Robert S. Bigelow, 1969,
The Dawn Warriors
We are indeed a social and
cooperative species. Throughout
life we help to generate social
resources, from freeways to
journals to the internet, via
collective endeavors and
divisions of labor. But such
cooperation is always permeated
by conflicts of interest, because
resources create opportunities
to compete, and to cheat. One
of the primary unresolved
questions in biology, psychology,
philosophy and economics is
understanding the ecological
and social circumstances
that favor and sustain
cooperation — especially when
cheating can often yield a higher
payoff.
Evolutionary biology has
provided some clues to solvingthe apparent paradox of
cooperation, with myriad studies
demonstrating how kinship,
mutualism, direct and indirect
reciprocity, and threat of
punishment can often keep
selfishness at bay [1–4]. But we
have missed something crucial,
perhaps because like the theory
of evolution itself, it is so obvious
and pervasive. We cooperate
and compete in groups, at scales
from local to global. In this
issue of Current Biology, West
et al. [5] demonstrate that the
spatial scale of competition can
drive the evolutionary dynamics
of social interaction among
non-relatives. In particular they
show that sociality is favored when
cooperation is more local and
competition more
global — precisely the
circumstances under which we
first so-cooperatively developed
nuclear weapons. This is a key
insight because it integrates the
theory of cooperation with the
real-world structures of human
grouping, and the real world
now needs all the cooperation
it can get.
The tension between conflict
and confluence of interest is
captured in a classic method to
study cooperation, a game first
developed by Merrill Flood and
Melvin Dresher in 1950 asa component of the RAND
corporation’s studies of global
nuclear war [6]. Two parties may
either cooperate or defect. The
highest joint payoff is achieved
via mutual cooperation, but each
player could achieve an even
higher reward if they defected
while their opponent cooperates.
In the 1950s, ‘cooperation’
represented the restraint motivated
by mutual assured destruction.
Albert Tucker resituated this game
of terror as the familiar ‘Prisoner’s
Dilemma’ of whether two
criminals held separately should
either cooperate (remain silent
about a joint crime) or ‘defect’
(incriminate the other). The
Prisoner’s Dilemma game has
become a touchstone for analyzing
the evolution of cooperation,
especially since Axelrod and
Hamilton [7] held a computer
tournament won by the strategy
‘Tit for Tat’: cooperate on the first
play, then mirror your opponent’s
previous choice. This strategy is
initially nice, forgiving of reformed
defection, and provokable to
defect, but it can only sustain
cooperation under special
circumstances and it departs
from realism in various
ways [7,8].
West et al. [5] are the first to
extend the structure of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game in space,
by adding a parameter
representing the proportion of
competition that occurs locally (in
a small group of social partners)
versus globally (in the population
of players as a whole) (Figure 1).
They have shown with an analytic
model that as competition
becomes more local, cooperation
is selected against. This result
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Figure 1. Players in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game
cooperate more, and
achieve higher joint pay-
offs, when competition is
global (across the whole
population) rather than lo-
cal (in small groups, here
with three players in each).makes intuitive sense in that, at
the local extreme, two players
compete only against each other,
and fitness (the payoff) is relative
only to one’s opponent. As
cooperation never leads to
higher relative payoff, the best
option is always to defect. This is
Darwin’s inexorable machinery of
natural selection at work, with
fitness always relative to others in
the population, no matter how
small that population may be. Or
how large — inevitable world
dominion of one political ideology
also provides an example, with
memes instead of genes or
strategies competing to increase
their frequency.
The upshot of West et al.’s [5]
model is that it predicts what
circumstances best enhance
cooperativeness. Cooperation
is favored under local repeated
interactions, with potential gains
from local helpfulness, but with
competition occurring at a much
larger spatial scale, across the
population at large or between
groups. The researchers tested
this prediction using
undergraduate students naı¨ve to
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, playing
an iterated game in small groups.
Cash rewards were given as
fitness payoffs under global
competition (rewards given only
for top scores across all players)
and under local competition
(rewards given only for the top
score within each of the multiple
small groups). As predicted by
the model, the students were
much more cooperative whencompetition was global. The
proximate mechanism? One
suspects that, under global
competition, a group-against-
group dynamic took hold, as
students cooperated locally in
hopes of ultimately scoring higher
than students in enemy groups.
But under local competition it
was every undergraduate for
himself or herself.
Like natural selection itself, this
theory and experiment are
deceptively simple, but the
implications are profound. The
social behavior of non-human
animals often involves
cooperation among non-relatives,
and natural selection should have
led to evolved strategies that
reflect the scales of competition
and cooperation. For example, in
some desert ants, unrelated
queens cooperate in incipient
colonies, driven by severe
competition between nearby
nests [9]. However, once a
colony is well-established,
cooperators turn killers until only
one queen remains. Other cases
of animal cooperation among
non-relatives should be
revisited with spatial structure
in mind.
In humans, strategic responses
to the scales of social costs and
benefits can be truly facultative.
We can therefore exploit them.
As West et al. [5] suggest,
engineering the spatial structure of
human groups in business
and academia may provide new
means of harnessing the
societal benefits possiblefrom both competition and
cooperation. More generally, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma represents
a binary version of the ‘public
goods’ game — the game that
famously generates the tragedy
of the commons [10,11]. Here,
benefits accrue to oneself, or one’s
local group, but costs are
burdened more globally.
Cooperation requires restraint
and prudent, long-term resource
use, but defection destroys the
resource for all. Fisheries,
forestry, climate change, and
the collapse of civilizations
form a familiar litany reminding
us of the rules and consequences.
Game theory was birthed in the
crucible of global conflict, and
fostered by John von Neumann,
architect of the modern computer
and the hydrogen bomb. Can it
help us now?
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